虚拟电厂运营商与电动汽车用户的主从博弈定价策略
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TM74

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江苏省重点研发计划资助项目(BE2020688)


Stackelberg game pricing strategy between virtual power plant operators and electric vehicle users
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    摘要:

    虚拟电厂(VPP)是管理分布式能源的重要手段,合理制定VPP运营商与电动汽车(EV)用户的定价策略,可引导EV充分消纳风、光等可再生能源,实现VPP运营商与EV用户的双赢。在此背景下,文中首先提出VPP作为售电运营商参与EV有序充电管理的主从博弈模型,其中运营商通过主从博弈制定合理的售电价格引导EV有序充电,并协调各类分布式资源参与电力市场。然后,计及风电出力的波动性和常规负荷的不确定性,在建模中引入条件风险价值(CVaR)理论,并通过Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)条件和对偶理论将模型转化为混合整数线性规划问题进行求解。最后,基于算例给出VPP运营商的最优定价策略及出力计划,并分析不同EV比例、储能最大容量、风险偏好系数对最优解的影响,为提高VPP运营收益提供优化思路。

    Abstract:

    Virtual power plant (VPP) is an important means of managing distributed energy. Reasonably formulating pricing strategies for VPP operators and electric vehicle (EV) users can guide EVs to fully consume renewable energy such as wind and solar, thus achieving a win-win situation for VPP operators and EV users. A stackelberg game model is firstly proposed in which a VPP with EVs is used as the electricity sales operator to participate in the orderly charging management of EVs. Operators formulate reasonable electricity selling prices through stackelberg game to guide the orderly charging of EVs, and coordinate various distributed resources to participate in the electricity market. Then, taking into account the volatility of wind power output and the uncertainty of conventional loads, the conditional value at risk (CVaR) theory is introduced into the modeling, and the model is transformed into a mixed integer linear programming problem solved by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and dual theory. Finally, based on an example, the optimal pricing strategy and output plan of VPP operators are given. The influence of different EV proportions, maximum energy storage capacity, and risk preference coefficient on the optimal solution is analyzed, which provides optimization ideas for VPP operators to improve revenue.

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李强,朱丹丹,黄地,吴盛军,杨永标,宋嘉启.虚拟电厂运营商与电动汽车用户的主从博弈定价策略[J].电力工程技术,2022,41(4):183-191

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  • 收稿日期:2022-02-15
  • 最后修改日期:2022-04-28
  • 录用日期:2022-05-30
  • 在线发布日期: 2022-07-20
  • 出版日期: 2022-07-28